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ABSTRACT 
Monkey see, monkey sue. Or better yet, monkey takes a selfie, monkey 
sues the camera owner for copyright infringement. This Note centers 
around the controversy of a monkey named Naruto who, via his next friend 
PETA, asserted a copyright infringement claim against a wildlife 
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photographer. Naruto claimed copyrights to selfies he took with the 
photographer’s camera. The case seems silly to most—including the court—
yet, the case seized the attention of academics and animal rights activists 
alike. Because animal art has grown in popularity and scientific studies have 
increased awareness of potential animal consciousness, this case does not 
come as a huge surprise. The case raises an interesting, but odd question: 
can a monkey be considered an author, thus warranting protection under 
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and the laws that enforce it?  
Recognizing animal authorship, despite the utilitarian arguments that it 
could only bring good to society, would fundamentally change not just 
copyright law, but American property law in general. Animals have long 
been considered property, and the proposition of granting property a 
fundamental property right is perplexing, to say the least. As it stands, case 
precedent and history do not allow a court to expand copyrights to cover 
animal authors. In addition to the precedential constraints, the threat of a 
fundamental change in the American property law tradition ensnares the 
concept of animal authorship in two additional “structural constraints.” Put 
plainly, the separation of powers doctrine and the theory of federalism upon 
which the United States is based disallows the courts, and could possibly 
restrain Congress, from recognizing animals as authors under the American 
copyright scheme. Naruto’s claim to authorship—if vindicated—could 
completely shift the property paradigm in the United States.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mahatma Gandhi once said, “The greatness of a nation and its moral 
progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.”1 Despite all of 
the protections afforded to animals via animal rights laws, the case 
discussed in this Note demonstrates that some believe Western nations have 
not come far enough in recognizing the rights of animals.2  
The case of Naruto the monkey would have likely been missed by even 
those most attentive to legal news as simply an outrageous claim by an 
extreme animal rights organization. The claim by People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) was that a monkey should have copyrights to 
his own selfie that he took with a nature photographer’s camera.3 The case 
was dismissed by the Northern District of California as unsupported by 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Can the Greatness of a Nation ..., PETA, http://www.peta.org/features/gandhi/ (last 
visited November 28, 2016).  
 2. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016). 
 3. Id. at *1. 
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precedent.4 However, the case seized the attention of the legal academic 
community.5 The query it poses is fascinating and odd, all at the same time: 
should an animal be considered an “author” and be afforded copyrights? 
Many authors have pondered this question. Some have concluded that 
animals should be granted copyrights while others have opined that those 
who work with the animals (e.g., photographers) should be granted the 
copyrights under a “work for hire” approach.6 Although the latter position 
requires a less dramatic change in the law, both frameworks fail to address 
the preliminary question that underlies the query: should the federal 
government be the one to grant property rights (in the form of copyrights) 
to animals?  
When examined through the lens of history and prior precedent, it might 
seem that the only barrier restraining the courts from expanding copyright 
protection to a monkey, like Naruto, is the underlying assumption that 
author in the Copyright Clause really means human author.7 A piece of 
animal art or a photograph taken by an animal can often meet the 
minimum standards of creativity and originality required by precedent.  In 
fact, some would argue an animal-human distinction is arbitrary.8 
According to them, the only apparent bar, then, to an animal’s copyright 
protection is the fact that the concept has not been recognized by legislators 
or the courts.  
However, prohibitions on copyright protection are not only due to 
specific constraints plainly spelled out in the law, but also due to the deeper 
assumptions of the American property law tradition.9 Granting animals 
copyrights—and therefore property rights—under federal law would 
completely upend the federal system of government in the United States of 
America.10 As such, this Note posits that the expansion of copyright 
protection is prohibited by two structural constraints11: (1) the separation of 
powers doctrine and (2) the federalist form of the United States 
government, or Federalism. The first constraint prevents the courts from 
expanding rights where the law does not contemplate them.12 A proper view 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. Id. at *1. 
 5. Infra Section IV. 
 6. See infra Section IV.B. 
 7. See infra Section III. 
 8. See infra Section IV.A. 
 9. See infra Section V. 
 10. See infra Section V. 
 11. See infra Section V. 
 12. See infra Section V.A.1. 
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of the judiciary’s role would disallow any court from extending copyrights 
to animals.13 Plainly put, a court is restrained to only interpret the law and 
not to create it where it does not already exist.  
The second constraint is the theory that the national and state 
governments operate within their own separate but often overlapping areas 
of sovereignty.14 In addition, the nature of the federal government is one of 
enumerated and not plenary powers.15 As such, the federal government is 
restrained from acting unless empowered to do so.16 Within the realm of 
copyright, it is the underlying theory of Federalism that prevents the courts 
(and most likely the Congress) from expanding federal copyrights until 
state property law has adapted and accepted animal property rights.17  
This second structural constraint is predicated upon the idea that 
property law is a creature of each individual state. Each state, being the 
creator of its own common law property scheme, should be allowed to 
decide whether animals are granted property rights and protections.18 It 
would be an unlawful seizure of state power and transformation of property 
law for the federal government to unilaterally expand animal property 
rights via copyright protection.19 As with other developments in the law, the 
theory of federalism would require that the federal government, even with 
its express power to grant copyrights, refrain from expanding animal 
property rights until property law has developed in the states to warrant 
expansion.20  
This Note will begin by discussing the background of Naruto v. Slater, as 
well as the arguments made by both sides on the motion to dismiss. Next, it 
will discuss the historical development of copyright law relied on by both 
the parties and the Northern District of California court in its opinion.  In 
addition, the Note will discuss the underlying purposes of copyright law. It 
will then lay out the various arguments that have been posited for the 
adoption of animal copyrights by the federal government in order to 
establish the reasoning behind the argument that case precedent and history 
of copyright law do not allow for such an expansion. Lastly, the Note will 
discuss the basic theories of separation of powers and federalism, and show 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See infra Section V.A.1. 
 14. See infra Section V.B. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 17. See infra Section V.B.2. 
 18. See infra Section V.B.2. 
 19. See infra Section V.B.2. 
 20. See infra Section V. 
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that these theories prevent the expansion of copyright protection to animals 
by the federal government.  
II.  THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER A MONKEY’S SELFIE 
“A monkey, an animal-rights organization and a primatologist walk into 
federal court to sue for infringement of the monkey’s claimed copyright.”21 
As stated earlier, this Note centers around the case of Naruto v. Slater.22 
Before the punchline of the preceding setup is revealed, one should 
understand the story of the case.  
A. A Monkey Takes a Selfie 
This story began in 2011 while David Slater was in Indonesia 
photographing Macaque monkeys.23 Slater gained the trust of a group of 
about twenty-five macaque monkeys over the few days he had been 
following them.24 Slater described winning the monkeys’ trust in an exciting 
narrative on his website: “I held out my hand and WOW, one held my hand 
back. Shock! This went on for maybe 15 minutes. They started to groom 
me, picking through my hair as I knelt on the ground, hunched over my 
camera, but desperate to record it all.”25 Afterwards, the monkeys took the 
camera from Slater several times, only to have Slater’s guide wrest it from 
them.26 These incidents allowed the monkeys to become semi-familiar with 
the equipment and to learn how to snap photos.27 Slater tells the rest of the 
story on his website:  
I wanted to keep my new found friends happy and with me.  I 
now wanted to get right in their faces with a wide angle lens, but 
that was proving too difficult as they were nervous of 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim 
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No. 
15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016 
WL 9843651. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Louise Stewart, Wikimedia Says When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, No One Owns It, 
CULTURE (Aug. 21, 2014) http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-dispute-wikimedias-claims-
about-monkey-selfie-copyright-265961 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 24. Sulawesi Macaques..., DJS PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/ 
original_story.html. (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
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something[—]I couldn’t tell what.  So I put my camera on a 
tripod with a very wide angle lens, settings configured such as 
predictive autofocus, motorwind, even a flashgun, to give me a 
chance of a facial close up if they were to approach again for a 
play.  I duly moved away and bingo, they moved in, fingering the 
toy, pressing the buttons and fingering the lens.  I was then to 
witness one of the funniest things ever as they grinned, grimaced 
and bared teeth at themselves in the reflection of the large glassy 
lens. . . . Perhaps also the sight of the shutter planes moving 
within the lens [ ] amused or scared them?  They played with the 
camera until of course some images were inevitably taken!  I had 
one hand on the tripod when this was going on, but I was being 
prodded and poked by would be groomers and a few playful 
juveniles who nibbled at my arms.  Eventually the dominant 
male at times became over excited and eventually gave me a 
whack with his hand as he bounced off my back.  I new [sic] then 
that I had to leave before I possibly got him too upset.  The whole 
experiance [sic] lasted about 30 minutes.  
It was like the joy of seeing your new baby learn about something 
new and becoming enlightened with a new toy.  They loved the 
shutter noise, but most of all they loved their own faces, 
“chimping” [sic] away in what seemd [sic] to me to be total fun 
for them.28 
The words of the photographer convey his excitement and passion, but 
these photos would soon create both the most outlandish and interesting 
legal battle of the past several years. Slater faced two legal battles over the 
monkey selfies.29 The first, and still ongoing, is a battle for the 
photographer’s own copyright of the photo against Wikimedia.30 
Wikimedia, an online digital commons website, posted the photo and then 
refused to remove the photo after Slater requested that the company take it 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. Id. One can sense the photographer’s joy and passion for his work. To view photos 
of the monkeys and read the entire story, see http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/. 
 29. A selfie is defined as “[a] photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically one 
taken with a smartphone or webcam and shared via social media.” Selfie, ENGLISH: OXFORD 
LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/selfie (last visited 
November 27, 2016). 
 30. Louise Stewart, Wikimedia Says When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, No One Owns It, 
CULTURE (Aug. 21, 2014) http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-dispute-wikimedias-claims-
about-monkey-selfie-copyright-265961 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
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down.31 Wikimedia claims that Slater does not own the photo, as it was the 
monkey who took it and not Slater; Slater, obviously, disagrees.32 The 
second is the legal battle on which this Note will primarily focus: the 
Northern District of California case of Naruto v. Slater.33 
B. The Legal Battle for Animal Copyrights  
While Slater was in the heat of the dispute with Wikimedia, PETA sued 
him, filing a lawsuit as next friend34 of the monkey who took the selfie.35 
PETA alleged that the monkey—which they named Naruto—not the 
photographer,36 owned the copyright to the photograph because the 
monkey  
authored the Monkey Selfies sometime in or around 2011” by 
“independent, autonomous action” in examining and 
manipulating Slater’s unattended camera and “purposely 
pushing” the shutter release multiple times, “understanding the 
cause-and-effect relationship between pressing the shutter 
release, the noise of the shutter, and the change to his reflection 
in the camera lens.37  
PETA also alleged that Slater infringed on Naruto’s copyright by “‘falsely 
claiming to be the photographs’ author and by selling copies of the images’ 
for profit,” and thus, violating Sections 106 and 501 of the Copyright Act of 
1976.38  
Slater filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.39 He concluded his introduction 
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016). 
 34. A next friend is “[s]omeone who appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an 
incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointed as 
a guardian.” Next Friend, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 35. Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
 36. The author will refer to the monkey as “he” in the article although it should not be 
construed to imply any assignment by the author of anthropomorphic qualities to the 
monkey.  
 37. Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
 38. Id. at *1. 
 39. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim 
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No. 
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with the punchline, “Monkey see, monkey sue is not good law[—]at least 
not in the Ninth Circuit.”40 Slater argued that animals had not been 
conferred standing to sue under United States copyright law.41 He stated 
that “[t]he standing inquiry for animals under Cetacean Community is very 
simple: unless Congress has plainly stated that animals have standing to sue, 
the federal courts will not read any legislation to confer statutory standing 
to animals.”42  
By citing binding authority that appealed to the separation of powers 
doctrine,43 Slater made it clear that Congress has never authorized standing 
for animals, and that until it does, the court should not authorize standing 
on its own authority.44 The defendant curtly concluded, “Still, if the humans 
purporting to act on Plaintiff’s behalf wish for copyright to be among the 
areas of law where non-human animals have standing, they should make 
that dubious case to Congress[—]not the federal courts.”45 The court 
evidently found Slater’s argument persuasive, as it would ultimately rely on 
this reasoning in its opinion.46  
PETA, in its response in opposition to the motion to dismiss,47 argued 
for an expansive view of authorship under copyright law which would grant 
standing to Naruto. PETA argued that because Congress has the power to 
grant standing to non-human entities such as corporations, Congress also 
has the power to grant standing to animals.48 They then argued that the 
                                                                                                                                      
15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016 
WL 9843651. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004)) 
 42. Id.  
 43. See infra Section V.B.1. 
 44. This Note does not focus on the standing issue. However, the appeal to separation of 
powers doctrine will be discussed later in the Note.  
 45. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim 
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No. 
15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016 
WL 9843651. 
 46. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016). “But that is an argument that should be made to Congress and the President, not to 
me.” Id.  
 47. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto 
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324-
WHO), 2015 WL 9392544. 
 48. Id.  
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Copyright Act “grants standing to anyone, including Naruto, who create[d] 
an ‘original work of authorship.’”49  
PETA relied on the fact that the Act itself does not define the word 
author, but rather “borrowed that term from the Constitution itself, which 
authorizes Congress to protect the ‘Writings’ of ‘Authors.’”50 Further, it 
relied on Burrow-Giles Lithographic in order to state the definition of author 
as “he to whom anything owes its origin.”51 PETA claimed that Naruto was 
the one who created the selfies, and had no assistance from Slater in doing 
so.  Thus, “he is their ‘originator,’ the one ‘to whom’ the photographs owe 
their ‘origin.’”52 PETA argued that Naruto’s allegation that he is the author 
of the selfies53 was enough to give him standing.54  PETA further argued that 
because the word author is not defined as specifically human, an animal 
author should be granted a copyright, so long as the animal author’s work 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)). The Court first 
defined an author as “he to whom anything owes its origin” in Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). Burrow-Giles is discussed in Section III.B. 
 52. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto 
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324-
WHO), 2015 WL 9392544. 
 53. PETA cites to Naruto’s Complaint paras. 1 and 2 which state: 
1. Naruto is a free, autonomous six-year-old male member of the Macaca 
nigra species, also known as a crested macaque, residing in the Tangkoko 
Reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia. In or around 2011 Naruto took a 
number of photographs of himself, including one image – the internationally 
famous photograph known as the “Monkey Selfie.” A copy of the Monkey Selfie 
is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit 1. 
2. The Monkey Selfie is one of a series of photographs (the “Monkey Selfies”) 
that Naruto made using a camera left unattended by defendant David John 
Slater (“Slater”). The Monkey Selfies resulted from a series of purposeful and 
voluntary actions by Naruto, unaided by Slater, resulting in original works of 
authorship not by Slater, but by Naruto. 
Complaint, Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016) (15-cv-4324), 2015 WL 5576925. 
 54. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto 
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324-
WHO), 2015 WL 9392544. As the case was at a Motion to Dismiss stage all allegations of the 
complaint must be assumed true. Id. Thus, PETA argues it has alleged Naruto is an author 
and that is sufficient while also arguing that Naruto legally qualifies as an author. Id. 
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can meet the creativity and originality thresholds set forth by prior 
copyright precedent.55  
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
The history of copyright law sheds light on the question of whether 
copyright protection should be expanded to include animal authors. 
Specifically, the adoption of the Copyright Clause, the development of the 
authorship requirement, and the major theories on the copyright law’s 
purpose provide a framework for answering this inquiry.  
A. The Adoption of the Copyright Clause 
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution endowed upon 
the legislature the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”56 The Copyright Clause 
was adopted with no argument and by the unanimous consent of the 
Framers at the Constitutional convention.57  
Copyrights were first recognized by the English Parliament in 1709 with 
the passing of the Statute of Anne.58 This statute marked a shift in the law, 
as it provided authors control of the rights to written materials, whereas the 
predecessor statute provided control to printers. The printers used 
copyright law to control the book industry.59 The Statute of Anne was 
enacted despite heavy lobbying by booksellers who wished to maintain their 
monopoly over the book trade in England.60  
The Statute of Anne extended copyrights to book authors for twenty-one 
years.61 “The fact that the author was entitled to hold the copyright did not 
trouble the booksellers since they insisted that the author give them the 
copyright before publishing a work.  If the author refused, the bookseller 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. Id. “The statute itself makes it clear that ‘[c]opyright protection extends to all 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium” of expression.’ The only 
requirement is that the work must be original.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 57. Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers 
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 367. 
 59. Id. at 366-67. 
 60. Id. at 367. 
 61. Id.  
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might not promote his book as vigorously.”62 Booksellers lobbied 
Parliament to pass a law allowing them to maintain a perpetual copyright 
on books, but Parliament refused.63 The booksellers then went to the courts, 
fighting for a common law right to perpetual copyright.64 However, the 
courts also refused to extend such a right. Instead, the courts found that an 
author did indeed have a common law right to his work, but that this right 
was limited by the Statute of Anne to twenty-one years.65  
Accordingly, by the time of the American Revolution, English copyright 
law had shifted from a mechanism “used to control the book trade to [one 
used to] encourage authors to write by rewarding them for their efforts.”66 
This was the first iteration of copyright law that not only required rights to 
be vested in the author, but also used the term “authorship” in the context 
of copyright law.67 The requirement of authorship would prove to be a 
central concept in the development of copyright law.68  With such a well-
established common law right to copyright, the inclusion of such a right in 
the U.S. Constitution was unsurprising.  
The goal of copyright law was to encourage the production of literature. 
Aptly, the Copyright Clause’s stated purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.”69 In addition to the English copyright law 
already in place, the Framers were most likely heavily influenced by the fact 
that the majority of the states had already adopted Copyright laws 
themselves.70 Noah Webster, in an effort to obtain copyrights in each state 
to an English school book he had written, travelled to many of the states 
and convinced them to adopt some form of copyright protection for 
authors.71 For example, after failing to lobby James Madison directly, 
Webster lobbied George Washington to encourage the adoption of a 
copyright law in Virginia.72 Webster’s efforts resulted in Madison 
presenting Virginia’s copyright bill in the legislative session of 1785. The bill 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. Id. 
 63. Donner, supra note 57, at 368. 
 64. Id. at 367-68. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 368. 
 67. Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphases of “Authorship,” 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468 (1991). 
 68. Id. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 70. Donner, supra note 57, at 374. 
 71. Id. 370-74. 
 72. Id. at 371. 
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was signed into law in 1786.73 By the time of the Constitutional Convention, 
twelve of the thirteen states had adopted copyright laws—due, at least in 
part, to Webster’s lobbying.74  
But why did the Framers federalize copyright law? The Framers needed 
to create a national and uniform system to better protect the rights of 
authors. “The frustration of Webster in his travels to obtain copyrights from 
each state was well known throughout the states.”75 An author, if he wished 
to obtain national protection, would need to travel to each state (as Webster 
did) and obtain the rights to his own work state-by-state.76 This was an 
unworkable system that did not create a nation of united common values, 
but rather frustrated that purpose by requiring an author to apply to—and 
comply with—over thirteen different copyright schemes. According to John 
Madison, there was a “want of concert in matters where common interest 
requires it.”77 He further added that “[i]nstances of inferior moment are the 
want of uniformity in the laws concerning . . . literary property.”78 It was 
this want of concert among the states that pushed the Framers to institute 
national protection to the well-established common law right of copyright 
protection.  
The English common law copyright, the states’ consensus on copyright 
protection, the Framers love for literature,79 and the republican ideals of “a 
social system built on merit”80—rather than special governmental 
dispensations—is what likely motivated the Framers to pass the Copyright 
Clause with unanimous consent. As James Madison conclusively wrote: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The 
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great 
Britain, to be a right of common law. . . . The public good fully 
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals. The States cannot 
separately make effectual provision for [copyright], and most of 
                                                                                                                                      
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 374. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Donner, supra note 57, at 374. 
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1870 128 (1901)). 
 78. Id. (alterations in original) 
 79. Id. at 375. 
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2017] FIRST, LET ME TAKE A SELFIE 147 
 
them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed 
at the instance of Congress.81 
B. Development of Copyright Law After the Founding  
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the Supreme Court set out to 
define what author meant within the context of a copyright or patent. The 
development of the authorship requirement began with the early cases of In 
Re Trademark Cases and Burrow-Giles. In Re Trademark Cases laid out the 
requirement that any invention or writing copyrightable under the 
Copyright Clause must be “original, and . . . founded in the creative powers 
of the mind.”82 The originality requirement is what differentiated copyrights 
from trademarks.83 In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court defined author for 
the first time.84 “An author . . . is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.’”85 
The Court also stated writings in the Copyright Clause included 
photographs and that the copyright for a photograph belonged to the 
photographer who staged the shot.86  
The following years saw many changes in copyright protections. In 1909, 
Congress passed a new Copyright Act. The Act broadened copyright 
protections to copies and not just prints. The new Act also broadened the 
categories of works protected to include all works of authorship, whether 
published or unpublished.87 The Act also introduced, for the first time, 
“language stating that the employer was the ‘author’ in the case of ‘works 
made for hire.’”88 Later, the Copyright Act of 1976 would further 
revolutionize copyright law by providing that works are copyrighted the 
moment they are created, not at the time they are registered.89 The Act also 
did many other things that further advanced copyright law.90 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 82. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis omitted). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). 
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 87. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright Law, 18 S. 
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CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 547, 564 (2009). 
 90. Id. at 564-565.  
148 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:135 
 
It is under this scheme that the Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Company, Inc. laid out the test to determine whether an 
author qualifies for a copyright.91 The first element, as in Burrow-Giles,92 is a 
“degree of originality.”93 However, all that is required by the new Copyright 
Act is “[a] modicum of intellectual labor . . . [to] constitute[] [this] essential 
constitutional element.”94 The second element is creativity, but only a 
“modicum of creativity” is required.95 These two standards—creativity and 
originality—are extremely low bars that allow the law to protect many 
different types of works without requiring courts to scrutinize the creativity 
of the author.  
In 2014, the Copyright Office stated that a work must owe its origin to a 
human author.96 It stated: 
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” 
that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because copyright law is 
limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the 
Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human 
being did not create the work. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).97 
The Copyright Office goes on to specifically deny copyrights to works 
authored by animals, which includes a selfie taken by a monkey.98 The 
Compendium specifically relies on the language discussed in Burrow-Giles 
and In Re Trademark Cases to substantiate its prohibition of animal 
                                                                                                                                      
[The] Act also extended the amount of “limited time” a work could receive 
protection. The Act extended the term of protection to the life of an author plus 
fifty years. The Act provided that works for hire be protected for seventy-five 
years. The Act applied to unpublished works as well as published works. The 
Act codified the sales doctrines and the fair use defense. The Act also explicitly 
allowed photocopying for academic work under certain circumstances and 
made a fair use for materials that are used for news, criticism, reporting, 
comments, teaching, etc. 
Id. 
 91. Feist Publs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1990). 
 92. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 93. Feist Publs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1990). 
 94. Id. at 347. 
 95. Id. at 346. 
 96. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 
306 (3d ed. 2014). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 313.2. 
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authorship.99 It was this section of the Compendium that the Naruto court 
relied on.100  
C. Theories of the Purpose of the Copyright Clause 
Some would argue that “[t]he chief justification for copyright protection 
in the United States is utilitarianism[,] [t]he active goal [which] . . . is the 
pervasive diffusion of intellectual works.”101 Another author argues, even 
more surprisingly, that the primary concern of copyright protection is to 
“advance society’s interest in increasing creative output” which “does not 
depend on the humanity of those authors.”102 Judge Posner opined that 
intellectual property law is a “natural field for economic analysis of law.”103 
He further argued that the law should seek to balance access and 
incentives.104  
Access is the ability of the public to enjoy the work of an author and the 
benefit of that work. Incentives are the economic motivation provided to 
the author by his ability to limit access to his work in order to recover the 
costs of producing that work.105 The ability of an author to limit the 
reproduction of his work—reproduction is generally much less costly than 
production—incentivizes an author to create more works, since he is able to 
recover some of the production costs as well as possibly make a profit from 
his work.106 Posner sought to balance this private incentive with the public 
interest in the fruit of individual intellectual labor107: “For copyright law to 
promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least 
approximately, maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus 
                                                                                                                                      
 99. Id. § 306. 
 100. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
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both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering 
copyright protection.”108  
The Copyright Clause’s purpose was written directly into it: “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”109 It would seem that the 
Framers, too, were balancing private and public interests in drafting this 
Clause. To equate the private interest, as Posner and the authors above do, 
to merely the economic benefit that accumulates to an author of a work is to 
miss the fundamental foundation of the American property law tradition: 
individual property rights.110  
The Framers believed in the republican ideal that each person was equal 
before the law, and that only a republican society based on merit could 
achieve true equality.111 “This promotion of individual merit was likely an 
additional motivating factor for a national copyright [protection] which 
secured for the individual author a property right in his works.”112  
The Copyright Clause was designed to protect what the Framer’s 
believed to be a fundamental property right that vested in the creator of a 
work. They saw the states’ challenges in protecting this right and sought to 
create a uniform system via the national government in order to secure 
intellectual property rights. Although they saw intellectual property as a 
fundamental right, they also saw the need for the collective to benefit from 
such works. Thus, the Framers placed a limit on the ability of the author to 
hold the copyright when the Framers wrote that the right would only be 
secured for a limited time.113 The Framers knew that with every 
fundamental right there was a balance that must be struck between 
protecting and incentivizing the individual’s interests and protecting the 
collective’s interest in promoting the general welfare.114  
In the copyright arena, the private interest is the fundamental right to 
one’s own work. The public interest is to ensure that no individual would 
profit on his intellectual work to the detriment of the public. The detriment 
to the public interest that would occur as a result of a perpetual copyright is 
not wholly obvious. To use a simple example, take a book on military 
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 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 110. Donner, supra note 57, at 375-76. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 376. 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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intelligence.115 The author researches and publishes a book about the subject 
of military intelligence. Said author dies or slips into the “unknown.” The 
author’s book is never published again so the author obtains no private 
benefit. However, because of his copyright, no one else besides those who 
own one of the original copies can learn from his research. The ideas of this 
author die along with him. The tragedy in this situation is that the public 
can never benefit from this man’s ideas, and the world, quite likely, is worse 
off because of it. A limited time for a copyright allows the individual to 
recover his costs in producing his work and exercise his fundamental right 
of ownership over his ideas, but it also allows the collective to benefit from 
his ideas should the author die or discontinue publishing his work. So, 
while Posner’s and others’ analysis that copyright law is correct in that the 
law seeks to balance public and private interests, the interests cannot be 
categorically reduced to economic interests. There are deeper interests than 
simply economic interests that are espoused by the American property law 
tradition: fundamental property rights.  
Another example of this concept is found in the Fifth Amendment, 
wherein the Framers empowered the federal government to take property 
from an individual in the interest of the collective.116 They placed limits on 
this ability by writing that “private property [may not] be taken . . . without 
just compensation.”117 The Framers believed that property ownership is a 
fundamental right, but they also believed that not all fundamental rights are 
unlimited. The Copyright Clause is no different: it protects the fundamental 
right of ownership while it also promotes the public good by incentivizing 
authors to produce works that will naturally benefit society.  
IV.  TO EXPAND OR NOT TO EXPAND 
Many have commented on the ability of animals to obtain copyright 
protection under the current legal regime. The most extreme position is 
that animals surely meet the requirements set out by precedent, while the 
most conservative position is that animals simply were not contemplated by 
Congress as being able to obtain copyrights.118 In between these positions is  
 
                                                                                                                                      
 115. This example was taken from the following source and was simplified. See Donald A. 
Barclay, Shouldn’t there be a time limit on Mickey’s copyright?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2016), 
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the idea that photographers, such as Mr. Slater, should be granted 
copyrights when working with animals, such as Naruto, under the “work 
for hire” doctrine. The extreme position that animals may obtain copyrights 
will be discussed in Section A. Section B will discuss the “in between” 
position.  Section C will critically analyze these two views, and then present 
how history and precedent should decide the query.  
A. Creativity of Animals as Justification for Expansion 
Feist required an author to show both creativity and originality in order 
to gain copyright protection.119 Accordingly, one of the first arguments that 
prior precedent should cover animal authors is that animals can meet these 
requirements of creativity and originality. One proponent of this theory, 
Dane E. Johnson, has argued that animals do, in fact, have the ability to 
create works that are worthy of copyright.120 In his work, Statute of Anne-
Imals, Johnson argues that creations of certain animals, such as monkeys, 
“‘[represent] the result of choices which would be described as creative if 
the “author” were human.’”121  
Additionally, another author, Holly C. Lynch, argues that chimps have 
shown both a desire and ability to draw in a humanly artistic manner. She 
writes about the observations of an ethologist Desmond Morris who 
concluded that a young chimp “‘carried in him, the germ, no matter how 
primitive, of visual patterns,’” or, in other words, the ability to create artistic 
works similar to those of humans involving an apparently similar creative 
process of making artistic choices. 122  
Lynch uses these scientific findings to point out that, based on only the 
creativity requirement, there is an inconsistency in the way the law protects 
a human’s creativity, but not a chimp’s creativity, even if the work is exactly 
the same.123 Lynch uses the example of a child and a primate to argue, 
consistently with Goodall’s theory, that the only difference between humans 
and chimps is humans’ use of sophisticated language.124  
The author contends that if a child and primate were to draw a picture, it 
would be impossible to distinguish the difference between the chimp’s 
creation and the child’s creation, except for the fact that the child will be 
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able to communicate exactly what it is that he attempted to create, whereas 
the chimp will only be able to “‘ooh oh ooo’ in his chimp voice.”125 The 
child, but not the chimp, can be granted copyright protection for his work; 
however, both of them, the author argues, satisfy the creativity and 
originality requirements of copyright law.126  
Johnson and Lynch both address the fact that animal authors cannot 
speak for themselves. They both argue that the law provides a remedy for 
children and incapacitated adults who legally cannot speak for themselves 
by the appointment of a guardian to speak on their behalf to the court.127 If 
a child were to assert his copyright, he would need to do so through a 
guardian.128 An animal should be afforded the same protection.129 
Ultimately, both authors conclude that animals can meet the creativity and 
originality requirements of the law, yet are not recognized simply because 
they are animals.130  
PETA made similar arguments in its legal brief.131 It argued that Naruto 
is the sole creator of the selfies by quoting Slater’s book, wherein he 
described the monkeys as possibly self-aware—i.e., able to recognize their 
own reflection, able to work the camera’s shutter button, and able to pose 
for the camera.132 PETA argued that these admissions by Slater show that 
Naruto was able to employ his creative capacities to create the 
photograph.133 PETA suggested that Naruto is the sole creator of the selfies 
because he was the one to press the button on the camera.134 In addition, 
PETA made similar arguments to those of Johnson and Lynch for 
guardianship protection of animals.135 PETA argued that it was inconsistent 
for copyright protection to be given to children and not animals because 
children are allowed to devise and inherit by law. 136 They argued that this is 
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inconsistent because children require a guardian to enforce their legal 
rights.137 PETA presented the idea that even though animals cannot enforce 
their own legal rights of inheritance, they could, like children, be appointed 
a guardian.138  
B. The Work for Hire Doctrine, Corporations as Authors, and Animal 
Copyrights 
Another, albeit less extreme, position on animal copyrights would apply 
the “work for hire” doctrine to animal authors.139 The work for hire 
doctrine was set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.  It states that “[i]n the 
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the 
work was prepared is considered the author.”140 Essentially, applying this 
theory would punt the idea of granting animals actual copyrights. Instead, it 
would just vest copyrights in a photographer who, like Slater, sets up the 
camera for the monkey to take the photo.141 The monkey would be treated 
as an assistant, or even as an employee of the photographer.142 Because the 
photographer sets up the photograph, the monkey actually snapping the 
picture would not take the photographer’s copyrights away. Similarly, the 
copyrights would not vest with a human assistant photographer who 
snapped the photograph set up by the senior photographer.143   
In her challenge to withholding copyrights from animals, Lynch also 
makes a comparison of animals to corporations. She makes the comparison 
that corporations, like animals, are not humans.144 However, corporations, 
unlike animals, are afforded copyright protection via the work for hire 
doctrine.145 She essentially argues that if copyright is, in fact, limited to 
strictly human authors then it should not cover nonhuman corporations.146 
Therefore, because corporations are deemed authors under the work for 
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hire doctrine, “author” is not inherently limited to only human actors. 
Thus, animals should also be considered authors.147  
C. Critical Analysis of Positions and the Current Precedent’s Verdict 
One of the key justifications for the expansion of copyrights to include 
animals is the idea that “author” has never truly been restricted to merely 
human authors.148 Supporters essentially argue that because originality and 
creativity are considered the touchstones for copyright protection, then an 
animal that can meet these requirements should be protected by a 
copyright.  
In claiming that the Copyright Office’s conclusion that animals cannot 
be authors149 is incorrect, one author states, “it can then be inferred that the 
Copyright Office is making the conclusion that an animal is incapable of 
[an artistic rendition].”150 This view of authorship presents several issues. 
Namely, advocates of animal copyrights have incorrectly concluded that the 
expansion of copyright law to cover additional works has created a 
precedent that militates for coverage of additional types of authors. Boiling 
authorship down to a mere evaluation of the creativity and originality 
requirements misapplies the law; those requirements apply to the work, not 
the author. Supporters of animal copyrights have wrongly equated the 
ability to protect additional works under copyright law with the ability to 
cover additional authors under copyright law. This falsely leads proponents 
of this view to believe that precedent and history would allow the expansion 
of the definition of author. Such a narrow focus on case precedent 
completely ignores the issue of whether an animal author can truly hold a 
property right, and the paradigm shift that such a recognition would cause.  
The Copyright Office and animal rights activists rely on Burrow-Giles, In 
Re Trademark, and Feist to help define authorship,151 but they often 
misapprehend the requirements of creativity and originality as being the 
minimum requirements for an author. To their credit, the authors initially 
present the material as the requirements for certain art or other publication 
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to be copyrightable; however, they then conclude that because animals can 
meet these bare minimum requirements, they should be deemed authors.152  
Although the authors seem to separate the two questions at first—can an 
animal produce copyrightable material? Should an animal be considered an 
author?—they often end up blending the two concepts, and in blending do 
not recognize that ability to create and authorship are two distinct concepts. 
For example, Lynch argues that animals meet the Feist test and can produce 
the copyrightable work, as they are mentally able to create art.153 She then 
follows this argument with a discussion on the law’s recognition of 
corporations as authors under the work for hire doctrine.154 Lynch argues 
that it is inconsistent for the law to allow a corporation to hold a copyright 
while it fails to fulfill the requirements of copyright law.155 Lynch argues that 
a corporation is not human and does not possess any human qualities 
because corporations “are not freethinking, they do not have emotions, and 
they are not creative.”156 Lynch challenges the humanness of a corporation 
based on its ability to be creative—i.e., its ability to meet copyright 
requirements. Since a corporation is not human, she wonders, “How are 
corporations able to hold copyrights . . . ?”157  
PETA rightfully points out this discrepancy in both the arguments of the 
defendant’s brief and the defendant’s discussion of the Compendium.158 In 
referring to Burrow-Giles and In Re Trademark Cases, PETA explains, 
“[n]either case held, or even considered, whether a human mind is 
necessary for copyright protection. Rather, these cases were addressing the 
requirement that copyrightable works must be ‘original.’”159 PETA was 
correct. All precedent that both the Compendium and the animal 
copyrights supporters have used to support their position addresses 
whether the work is copyrightable and not whether the author may obtain a 
copyright.  
The question in Burrow-Giles was whether a photograph would warrant 
copyright protection, not whether a photographer was an author. 
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Additionally, the test in Feist lays out the requirements for a work to be 
copyrightable, not what qualifications an author must have. This distinction 
is an important one. In fact, there are two questions that must be dealt with 
in solving this issue: (1) whether the work is copyrightable; and (2) whether 
the “author” is an author under the purview of the Copyright Clause. The 
prior cases simply do not address the latter question.  
In order to answer this question, it is appropriate to examine the roots of 
copyright law because there is not specific precedent on point.160 Copyright 
law was founded upon the need of the national government to protect state-
created copyrights.161 It was also founded after the common law right to a 
copyright on original works by the author was clearly established. One 
author admits, “It would likely not have occurred to the Framers that 
anything or anyone except a human could be an author.”162 As discussed 
previously, the purpose of the Copyright Clause was to balance private 
interest of authors in their works with the public’s interest in the works’ 
consumption and continued production.163 Copyright law is inherently a 
balancing of fundamental property rights and the public welfare.  
Human authorship is the cornerstone of copyright law. The original 
Statute of Anne was created to grant copyrights to authors of books, and the 
English court eventually found this to be a common law right.164 Animals 
have never had a common law right to anything they “create.” In fact, 
throughout history and even in modern times, the common law has viewed 
animals as property themselves.165 At the time of copyright law’s inception, 
neither the Framers of the Constitution, the English courts, nor Parliament 
ever contemplated whether animals or any other nonhumans could be 
authors. Additional support for the modern intent of legislators is the fact 
that the Copyright Act provides for protection for “the life of the author and 
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70 years after the author’s death.”166 Also, the Act provides for the rights of 
an author’s widow or widower after the author’s death.167 Although the law 
is not explicitly clear as to the humanity requirement, these provisions of 
the law clearly demonstrate that even modern legislators only meant to 
cover human authors. To conclude that “authors” is an ambiguous term 
within the Constitution or the Copyright Act is to completely ignore the 
common law property tradition that exclusively granted property rights to 
humans and the vast amount of context clues within the Act.  
One of the concepts that animal copyright supporters use to substantiate 
their argument that the word “author” has been expanded over the years is 
the work for hire doctrine, which makes corporations authors under the 
Copyright Act.168 However, this argument misses a fundamental point; 
despite stating that the corporation is the “author,” the true author is the 
human who is working for the corporation. Essentially, the law was created 
so that the two-step transaction of vesting copyrights in an employee, who 
would then contractually assign his/her copyrights to his/her employer, 
could be avoided.  
Furthermore, this area of law is governed by agency principles, which 
mandates that works produced by an employee for an employer belong to 
the employer.169 “The employer [is] . . . the visionary, and the employee [is 
the] . . . mechanic following orders.”170 The American law tradition has had 
a hard time separating corporations from their owners.171 Regardless of the 
judicial application of human characteristics and protections to nonhuman 
entities, it cannot be denied that these entities are made up of humans. 
Thus, when a work is created for hire by an employee of a corporation, it is 
not created by the corporation, it is created by a human employee. 
Accordingly, the copyright is assigned to the “visionary” or employer rather 
than the employee. The law did not create a new category of creative beings, 
but rather structured copyright law to conform to the common law of 
agency. 
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Although “[t]he Supreme Court emphasizes that the Copyright Act must 
be interpreted broadly to achieve the purpose on which it is based,”172 it 
simply cannot abandon its roots in the common law. Contrary to the 
accusations of animal copyrights supporters, the law has not done so. 
Therefore, despite the arguments that the current precedent would allow 
expansion of copyright law to cover animal authors, this is not the case. Not 
only would that abandon the law’s roots in the common law, it would cause 
a fundamental shift in the paradigm of American property law. Such a 
drastic shift is more appropriate in the states rather than in the federal 
government.  
V.  STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXPANSION 
The separation of powers doctrine and federalism place structural 
constraints on the expansion of copyright law to include animal authorship. 
The separation of powers doctrine precludes the courts from interpreting 
the law in such a way that it legislates a new meaning. Federalism requires 
that the federal government recognize and respect the member states of the 
Union and their right to develop property law schemes. 
A. Separation of Powers Doctrine and Copyright Law 
The separation of powers doctrine is deeply embedded in the American 
constitutional tradition and has been written about since the founding of 
America.173 The principle that there are three distinct powers of 
government—legislative, judicial, and executive—that should be exercised 
by separate branches of the government was of paramount importance to 
the Framers of the constitution.174 The reason for the separation was to 
avoid the concentration of all powers into one branch of government.175 The 
Framers sought, more or less, a balanced government in which the branches 
that were selected or elected differently would need to cooperate in order to 
govern.176 They feared a repeat of a monarchy that was able to control every 
                                                                                                                                      
 172. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto 
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324-
WHO), 2015 WL 9392544. 
 173. See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 174. Id. 
 175. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 176. The executive is elected by the entire nation, the legislature is made up of locally 
elected officials, and the judicial branch is appointed by the executive and confirmed by the 
Senate. The system by design consists of both separate and interdependent branches. See U.S. 
CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
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aspect of the law and its enforcement; they believed and espoused a 
minimalist government.177 Although a general theory, this idea provides the 
basis for limitations on each branch, including the judicial branch. 
The principle of separate and distinct branches touches every decision of 
a court when it interprets the law. The courts must be careful not to expand 
the law or even rewrite the law under the pretense of interpreting it.178 The 
copyright law derives its power from the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution, and therefore, when interpreting or defining the word 
“author,” the courts must trace the word’s meaning back to its original 
meaning within the general grant of power in the Constitution. The 
Framers would have never contemplated that an animal could obtain 
property rights, and the precedent and development of copyright law has 
never allowed for expansion within the realm of authorship.179 The only 
expansion one can see is the expansion of the law to cover newly created 
works of human authorship.180 Therefore, were the court, as PETA requests, 
to interpret the word author to mean literally anyone (or thing) “to whom 
anything owes its origin”181 it would be stepping outside of its role as a court 
and would become a legislature. Because the original intent, and all the 
subsequent precedent, points to human authorship, if the court were to 
include animals as authors, it would utterly change the meaning of author 
in copyright law.  
It is not the province of the courts to create law, only to interpret it. The 
District Court Judge in Naruto clearly understands this concept since he 
concluded: “Naruto is not an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act. Next Friends argue that this result is ‘antithetical’ to the ‘tremendous 
[public] interest in animal art.’ Perhaps. But that is an argument that should 
be made to Congress and the President, not to me.”182 Despite scientific 
advances in understanding animal consciousness and creativity, it is simply 
outside of the court’s role to read animal authorship into the Copyright Act, 
much less the Constitution.  
                                                                                                                                      
 177. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Doctrine’ of Separation of Powers, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986). 
 178. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 179. See supra Section IV.C. 
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 181. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto 
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324-
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 182. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 
2016) (citation omitted). 
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B. Federalism’s Role in Constraining Copyright Jurisprudence 
Federalism, in the most general sense, is a covenantal form of 
government in which there are multiple sovereigns with different, though 
often overlapping, spheres of control.183 In the United States, there is one 
national sovereign and fifty local sovereigns (the states).184 Each sovereign 
has its own sphere in which it governs. It is this concept that restrains an 
enumerated national government from expanding property rights which 
are truly creatures of the states.  
1. Federalism Generally 
The Framers created two levels of sovereigns, dividing authority in the 
new Union “along subject-specific lines.”185 The federal legislature is one of 
enumerated powers where “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and 
limited; and [so] that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
Constitution is written.”186 There are several modern theories of how this 
division of power works and should work in the United States; however, the 
Supreme Court has most closely adhered to the concept of “dual 
federalism.”187 Dual federalism recognizes that the federal and state 
governments have distinct and mutually exclusive realms in which they 
regulate.188 
                                                                                                                                      
 183. This is the author’s own definition derived from various sources he has reviewed 
over his academic career. Although it most likely can be attributed to various sources, he 
cannot point to a certain source for this simple definition. This Note is not intended to be a 
robust discussion of the various theories and definitions of federalism (and there are many) 
but rather just a general overview of the federalist system and how it may prevent the federal 
government from expanding federal property law. 
 184. As Justice Kennedy famously wrote: 
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by 
the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in 
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations 
to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 185. Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make A Federal System? On Constitutional 
Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831 (2010) (quoting ALISON 
L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)). 
 186. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
 187. Christopher K. Bader, A Dynamic Defense of Cooperative Federalism, 35 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 161, 165 (2014). 
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Another theory of federalism, Collective Action Federalism, sees Article I 
Section 8 as a grant of general authority to promote the general welfare 
(meaning national welfare) with each clause illuminating a specific instance 
in which the federal government should regulate.189 Essentially, proponents 
of this theory of federalism state that the purpose of the national 
government is to regulate in areas of national concern which would require 
a national government to regulate in order to have any law passed have the 
proper effect190 For example, as discussed in prior sections, copyright law is 
best regulated by the federal government because each individual state 
cannot protect its citizens adequately from citizens of another state violating 
local copyrights.191  
2. Application to Copyright Jurisprudence 
How does the federal government regulate copyright protection within 
this system of government? To some, “[w]here the Constitution permits 
one to regulate, it has plenary authority.”192 To others, the power of the 
federal government is limited to those powers enumerated in the 
Constitution only.193 Regardless of the theory of federalism that one 
chooses, the issue of animal authorship presents an interesting problem that 
challenges the nature of our Union. Undoubtedly, the federal government 
has the power to regulate copyrights and this power was given because it 
was necessary for a national government to protect individuals across the 
Union from copyright infringement.194 The Copyright Clause, at its 
inception, merely created a mechanism that would secure preexisting state 
property rights across the Union.195  
Despite the ever-expanding role the federal government plays, there has 
been a recent resurgence in the Supreme Court, beginning with Justice 
Rehnquist, of a federalism that respects the states plenary power over 
certain core areas of regulation.196 That begs the question, does copyright 
law implicate one of these core areas where states generally have plenary 
                                                                                                                                      
 189. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010). 
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authority? The answer is emphatically, yes. Copyrights have their basis in 
property law—i.e., the right to own or exclude.  
The right to copyright was a common law right before the passage of the 
Copyright Clause and nearly every state in the Union had already created 
their own copyright schemes.197 The Copyright Clause was adopted because 
the states could not alone enforce their own citizens’ copyrights, or as 
Madison put it, “The States [could not] separately make effectual provisions 
for [copyright]”198 and thus, federal action was not only prudent, but also 
required to protect the common law right to intellectual property. The 
federal scheme merely secured a preexisting state property right for citizens 
of certain states against the citizens of other states. It did not create any new 
“federal right.” The Copyright Clause implicates an area of the law that is 
generally regulated by the states: property law.  
The Supreme Court has dealt with the interaction of federal guarantees 
and state property laws before. For example, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, the Court addressed regulatory takings of land by states.199 South 
Carolina passed a regulation disallowing construction on a certain island 
due to beach erosion.200 The plaintiff argued this regulation made his land 
economically valueless.201 A regulation by a state that renders land 
completely valueless constitutes a regulatory taking, and the state must 
compensate the individual for his land.202 Justice Scalia first reviewed 
precedent, which held that the Takings Clause limits states from passing 
bills that render land economically valueless in the name of merely the 
public interest.203  
Accordingly, Justice Scalia deferred to state law to formulate how 
regulatory takings cases should be adjudicated.204 Summarily, he held that 
the Takings Clause disallows a state from rendering land economically 
valueless by a new regulation unless that restriction “inhere[s] in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”205 In other 
words, state property law, prior to the adoption of the new regulation, 
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would determine whether that regulation rendered the land valueless. If the 
desired use were a nuisance, for example, then the regulation prohibiting 
that use could not be a regulatory taking. “[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for 
example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the 
requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the 
effect of flooding others’ land.”206 
Without laboring over the Court’s takings jurisprudence, the principle 
Lucas demonstrates is that the federal judiciary is required to respect state-
created and regulated rights—i.e., property rights. Justice Scalia deferred to 
“background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance”207 in 
order to determine whether a property was truly valueless before the state 
passed the new regulation or prohibition. In other words, the right to 
property and the right to enjoy it could be limited by state common law 
principles without it constituting a regulatory taking. It was state common 
law that determined whether the regulation was a taking and not federal 
principles or jurisprudence. State guarantees of property were simply 
secured by the Takings Clause and new property rights were not necessarily 
created.  
This interaction of state and federal regulation can help inform the way 
the federal government regulates copyrights. Just as the Takings Clause is 
limited to respecting how states treat property rights so, too, should the 
federal government be limited in its ability to recognize new authors under 
the Copyright Clause.  
The original intent of the Copyright Clause was to secure the preexisting 
rights of human authors. Subsequent expansions of copyright protections 
merely expanded the type of mediums that are protected, not the type of 
authors that are protected. Without a clear authorization by the 
Constitution, whether developed from precedent or history, how can the 
courts or the legislative branch recognize a new property right never before 
contemplated? The federal government cannot. The area of property rights 
is clearly regulated, and often created, by the states.  
It would be an inappropriate overstep into the states’ spheres of 
governance for the federal government to recognize animal property rights. 
To do so would upend state property schemes that, as of now, only 
recognize animals as property themselves. The changing standard of 
consciousness and awareness as the basis for property rights is something 
that should be experimented with in the states, and then possibly 
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recognized and secured by the federal government, not vice versa.208 A 
federal government that violates states’ sovereignty over property law is one 
that violates the very basis for our Union: federalism and separate spheres 
of governance. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
American copyright law had its beginning in the newly formed states just 
prior to the creation of the United States of America. It was not created by 
the Constitution, but was rather secured and protected by a national 
government out of necessity. Precedent and statutory history lay no 
foundation upon which copyright can be expanded to include animal 
authorship. In addition, the separation of powers doctrine would disallow 
the Supreme Court from reinterpreting the Clause to include animal 
authors.  
Lastly, the Supreme Court has recognized its role in the realm of 
property jurisprudence and that is one most often of deferral and respect 
for the states’ ability to regulate their own property law schemes. To allow 
the courts or any other federal branch to rewrite state law by allowing 
animal ownership of property would shatter the divides of the federal 
system. State property law should be regulated by the states and secured by 
the federal government. Therefore, until the states recognize animals as 
having the ability to own property, the federal government must not grant 
copyrights to monkeys. Monkey see, monkey sue is, in fact, bad law.  
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